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THE CHALLENGE OF REMEDIES 
F. ANDREW HESSICK* 
INTRODUCTION 
Remedies are the primary reason for litigation. Most plaintiffs bring 
lawsuits to receive some recourse for a wrong or to prevent an impending 
harm. A Remedies class teaches the rules and principles guiding how to 
fashion these forms of relief. It explores how damages should be calculated, 
whether an injunction should be awarded, what that injunction should look 
like, and countless other topics about how to right wrongs. 
Despite the importance of Remedies, the class on Remedies receives 
surprisingly little attention in law school. My sense from informal 
conversations is that schools do not always offer it, and it is often not heavily 
enrolled. The majority of classes in law school focus on whether a plaintiff is 
entitled to relief under substantive law. They rarely spend much time on what 
that relief should look like. At best, most students might have spent a day or 
two on remedies in Contracts and perhaps Torts. Or they might have spent 
some time in Criminal Procedure on why exclusion is an appropriate remedy 
for constitutional violations. 
A Remedies class should be a more central component of law school. It 
should be offered more, and more students should take it. That topic is the first 
thing I talk about in this Essay. To that end, I provide a synopsis of the lecture 
I give to students on the first day of Remedies class explaining why they 
should take Remedies. 
Part II of this Essay is devoted to highlighting two challenges that arise in 
teaching Remedies. First, a Remedies course merges together two historically 
separate areas of law and equity into one course.1 Although similar principles 
 
* Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. As always, 
thanks to Carissa Hessick for comments and suggestions. 
 1. See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 
162 (2008). Law refers to common law and statutes, the violation of which the courts of law, such 
as the King’s Bench, had jurisdiction to remedy. See, e.g., Eric A. White, Note, Examining 
Presidential Power Through the Rubric of Equity, 108 MICH. L. REV. 113, 117 (2009). Equity 
developed at the hands of the Chancery Court, whose role was to dispense justice in cases in 
which the law did not provide a remedy. JAMES P. HOLCOMBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, ON THE BASIS OF STORY’S COMMENTARIES, WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO 
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CASES, ADAPTED TO THE USE OF STUDENTS 14–15 (1846). The goal of 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
740 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:739 
apply to law and equity, they differ in significant ways, and care must be taken 
to ensure that students keep them straight. Second, the law of Remedies cuts 
across other areas of the law. The same law of Remedies applies to remedy 
breaches of contracts, commissions of torts, and violations of constitutional 
law. Although the trans-substantive nature of Remedies makes it ideal to 
illustrate broader principles in law, it often causes at least some 
consternation—if not confusion—among students. 
I.  WHY REMEDIES? 
In all my classes, I start the first day with an explanation for why the class 
is important. In first year classes like Civil Procedure, the talk is designed 
mostly to give the students some information about what is to come. In upper 
level classes like Remedies, the talk not only gives information about the 
course; it also is intended to let them know why students should take this class 
as opposed to another. 
For Remedies, the sell is easy. Remedies are what make lawyers 
marketable. Remedies are the deliverables that lawyers provide their clients. 
Clients come to lawyers because they perceive that they have been grieved and 
they are seeking some sort of recourse. They are not particularly interested in 
the legal theory. Sure, there are some people who are more interested in 
establishing a doctrine through judicial decision than in obtaining a remedy to 
right a wrong in a particular case.2 But they are the exception. The vast 
majority of clients want whatever they are due under the law. A client who 
walks in the door and complains that his prize goose has been stolen from his 
yard is not interested in substantive doctrine about the elements of conversion. 
He wants something done about the theft—his goose returned or some 
compensation. 
Although students are aware that the driving force behind cases is getting a 
remedy, they often do not realize the centrality of remedies. They think that the 
primary role of the court is to expound on the law, not to provide remedies to 
the injured. Remedies are just something that happens after the court has 
finished its legal discussion. That this happens is not surprising. Most classes, 
especially in the first year, focus on the development of doctrine and 
precedents through court decisions. Also contributing to this problem is the 
 
equity was to deter, not punish, and the chancellor had broad discretion to accomplish that goal. 
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
 2. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 31–
32 (1995) (arguing that one reason that public interest groups bring suit is “that there are 
principles to defend”); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 323 (2008). 
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fascination with the Supreme Court—a court whose role is much more to 
resolve legal questions than to award remedies.3 
Remedies also provide the tools of the trade, the weapons that lawyers use 
to get things done. Students know about the basics of damages and injunctions 
from other classes, and they might have some sense about writs of mandamus 
from their discussion of Marbury v. Madison4 in Constitutional Law, but their 
knowledge is limited. They are generally unaware of the variety of tools that 
the law provides to accomplish results. Remedies opens their eyes to 
ejectment, restitution, and an assortment of other more exotic remedies that 
serve uniquely useful functions, as well as the preliminary forms of relief like 
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. 
The focus on providing solutions for clients also means that a Remedies 
class provides an excellent opportunity to develop problem-solving skills. 
There has been a push recently for law schools to help law students develop 
problem-solving skills, and for good reason. Clients often come to attorneys 
seeking a solution to a problem, not to develop doctrine. For example, a client 
might come to a firm seeking to fight global warming. There are many ways to 
deal with that problem: one can petition the EPA for regulations, file nuisance 
suits against major polluters, lobby Congress, write op-eds, or create a non-
profit devoted to solving global warming. All of these approaches work 
together towards the single aim of solving the problem. 
Doctrinal classes, on the other hand, do not provide much of an 
opportunity for problem-solving. They usually do not address how the material 
being studied can be used in tandem with the material taught in other classes to 
accomplish particular results; instead, they focus on how the substantive 
material can be used as one way to solve a problem. A class on administrative 
law, for example, will teach how to bring an arbitrary and capricious challenge 
against a rulemaking, but it will not spend much time exploring other avenues 
in case the challenge fails. 
A Remedies class provides a nice opportunity to focus on problem-
solving. Consider the client with the stolen goose. There are a variety of 
options available. He can sue for damages, seek restitution, bring an action for 
replevin, request an injunction—the list goes on and on. Each form of relief 
has its advantages and disadvantages. Choosing among the various remedies 
requires the student to be creative and to figure out how best to achieve the 
client’s goals while at the same time imposing the fewest costs. 
For all its practicality, Remedies still carries plenty of theoretical heft. 
Whether a remedy should be available in a particular case, and determining 
what that remedy should be, raises interesting questions about the goals of our 
 
 3. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus 
Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 278–79 (2006). 
 4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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legal system. Should remedies seek to promote efficiency, fairness, justice, or 
some other goal? Each of these frameworks can lead to different remedies for 
identical violations. 
A Remedies course also raises important questions about the role of the 
courts in enforcing rights. Every time a court provides a remedy, it changes the 
status quo. The remedy requires A to do something (or refrain from doing 
something) for B. When this change in the status quo affects future conduct, it 
raises questions about the appropriate role of the courts, because telling people 
how they should act in the future is essentially a policy question. This is one of 
the reasons that injunctions are considered exceptional remedies, to be 
provided only in the last resort and only when the overall benefit exceeds the 
cost.5 An injunction by its nature dictates how people should act in the future. 
That an injunction involves policy decisions is particularly clear in cases where 
there are various ways that the legal violation can be cured. Consider school 
bussing. Courts ordered bussing to end racial segregation following Brown v. 
Board of Education.6 But bussing is not the only possible injunction that the 
courts could have entered. They could have ordered simply that schools 
integrate without specifying the means for achieving that integration. 
The policy effects are often not limited to the precise terms of an 
injunction. As Judge Easterbook has noted, telling a school district that it must 
bus students reduces the incentive for the community to invest in its local 
schools.7 Those schools no longer educate just the residences’ children; they 
educate the children of others. 
The policy implications are not limited to injunctions. They extend to 
every form of remedy. Consider compensatory damages. Compensatory 
damages are meant not to deter but to provide redress for harm that the 
individual plaintiff has suffered because of the defendant’s wrongdoing.8 Even 
so, compensatory damages do have a deterrent effect, at least when the costs of 
the harm exceed the benefits that the defendant receives.9 But legal wrongs can 
have virtually infinite consequences.10 To avoid overdeterrence, courts limit 
 
 5. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–13 (1982). 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 
1, 30 (1971) (mandatory bussing implemented on district-wide basis). 
 7. Frank H. Easterbrook, Civil Rights and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 106 
(1991). 
 8. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“Compensatory 
damages are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 9. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Knowing that he will have to pay 
compensation for harm inflicted, the potential injurer will be deterred from inflicting that harm 
unless the benefits to him are greater.”). 
 10. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case 
of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 58–59 (1990). 
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the availability of compensatory damages. For this reason, plaintiffs cannot 
recover for consequential damages that are not reasonably foreseeable for 
breach of contract,11 since no person in his right mind would enter into a 
contract without knowing his exposure.12 Likewise, plaintiffs cannot recover 
damages to compensate for detention that resulted from evidence recovered in 
a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.13 Awarding damages for the 
detention would overdeter officers; plaintiffs accordingly may recover only for 
the illegal search itself.14 
The issue of the appropriate role of the court is particularly acute when it 
comes to remedies entered against governmental entities. On the one hand, 
remedies for wrongs committed by the government should be available not 
only to make injured persons whole but also to hold government actors 
accountable. On the other hand, requiring the government to act or abstain 
from acting or ordering another government body to pay damages can amount 
to a serious intrusion on the powers of that body. Requiring the government to 
expend resources to comply with an injunction or pay damages diverts 
resources from solving other problems.15 
These concerns underlie sovereign and qualified immunity, though neither 
are technically doctrines about remedies. But even when immunity does not 
preclude suit, these concerns lead courts to be cautious in fashioning remedies 
against government bodies. In Horne v. Flores, for example, the Court 
considered whether an injunction should continue against Arizona requiring it 
to fund programs to teach English to non-native speakers.16 One reason the 
Court provided while concluding that continuing the injunction was improper 
was that respect for federalism demanded that the federal courts interfere as 
little as possible in the state’s decisions about education.17 
II.  CHALLENGES OF REMEDIES 
Remedies is a difficult subject, both to teach and to learn. Even topics that 
seem like they should be relatively easy often are not. Consider expectation 
 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 351 (1981). 
 12. See, e.g., Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 
1994). 
 13. Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (“When a federal court orders that money 
be appropriated for one program, the effect is often to take funds away from other important 
programs.”); Catherine T. Struve, Sovereign Litigants: Native Americans in Court, 55 VILL. L. 
REV. 929, 949–950 (2010) (“Immunity protects the sovereign’s monetary resources and permits 
those resources to be directed according to the decisions made by the political branches of the 
sovereign’s government.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 16. Horne, 557 U.S. at 439–45. 
 17. Id. at 452.  
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damages for breaches of contract. Students often have difficulty ascertaining 
what a plaintiff could legitimately expect under a contract and grasping that 
those damages may be mitigated, especially when the mitigation leads to the 
counterintuitive result of no damages. 
There are also broader issues that do not pertain to a single topic but 
instead underlie the entire Remedies course. One of these issues is that 
Remedies is actually an amalgam of two classes, one on equity and the other 
on law. Another is that, even though the question of what remedy to award is 
separate from the question whether the substantive law was violated, 
substantive law can still influence the types of remedies available. I find it 
useful to point these issues out to students so that they may more easily 
identify and understand unifying principles and themes that run through 
Remedies. 
A. Two Different Classes 
The biggest challenge derives from the fact that Remedies is in some sense 
two classes combined into one. Historically, there were two threats of 
remedies—remedies from the law courts and remedies from the chancellor.18 
They were separate systems, and in some places still are.19 Once upon a time, 
classes reflected these differences. Law schools offered a class on equity and 
taught damages in other classes. 
Merging law and equity into one class has benefits. Conceptually, all 
remedies should be taught in one class for the same reason that it made sense 
to merge the two judicial systems into one. All remedies serve the same goals 
of seeking to make the plaintiff whole in some sense and preventing future 
wrongdoing, either directly, as in the case of an injunction, or indirectly 
through deterrence.20 Moreover, joining the two subjects into one class 
presents an opportunity for discussing the interactions, similarities, and 
differences between the two systems. Although some other classes, notably 
Civil Procedure and Federal Courts, discuss the relationship between law and 
equity to some extent, they do not do so in the depth that Remedies does. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A 
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1601 (2003). Of course, equity could operate only 
when the law provided no remedy. But competition with equity led to the recognition of new 
common law rights and remedies. 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456 
(4th ed. 1936). 
 19. For example, Delaware still maintains separate courts of chancery and courts of law. 
Compare DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 341 (2012) (“The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine all matters and causes in equity.”), with DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 541 (2012) (defining 
jurisdiction of superior courts to hear matters of “law[]”). 
 20. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (noting the deterrent 
effect of monetary damages). 
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On the other hand, combining the topics into one class presents several 
challenges. One is that there is a lot of material to cover. The topic of equity 
has not gotten any smaller from the times when it was taught as its own course. 
Indeed, there is enough material in equity alone—public injunctions, private 
injunctions, contempt, defenses, to name a few—that covering everything in 
one course is difficult to do. Damages could likewise easily consume an entire 
course. One could spend days discussing the basic theories of damages, how to 
use actuarial tables and other statistics to assess damages, what constitutes a 
harm potentially warranting compensation, how to apportion harm among 
tortfeasors, why the law does not provide compensation for some types of 
harms, how damages may be calculated differently for different types of 
actions, whether courts should award punitive damages, and so on. 
More importantly, even though the law has merged remedies, the merger is 
not complete. Different principles still apply to equity and law. Equity depends 
on discretion and flexibility to do justice while damages generally follow more 
rigid rules.21 Consequently, courts have developed requirements for securing 
injunctive relief that do not apply to damages.22 
Some of these different rules make a good deal of sense because of the 
different functions and consequences of law and equity, but others make less 
sense. Consider laches and statutes of limitations. The purpose underlying both 
is to ensure that a plaintiff brings suit within a reasonable amount of time to 
avoid prejudicing the defendant.23 For laches, the judge says what is 
reasonable;24 for statutes of limitations, a statute declares what constitutes a 
reasonable amount of time. 
One explanation is that equity traditionally depended on the court’s 
discretion and fixing a time period would be inconsistent with that tradition. 
But that concern has largely fallen by the wayside. Although fixed time periods 
might have been too rigid once upon a time, today they accommodate 
discretion through the doctrines of tolling and estoppel.25 
Another explanation is that damages are retroactive relief from a harm 
arising from some past event while equity seeks to remedy an ongoing or 
 
 21. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
 22. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–13 (1982). 
 23. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1971) (statute of limitations); 
Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951) (laches). 
 24. See McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 161, 168 (1843) (stating that to avoid laches, 
“[t]here must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of 
the court”). 
 25. Equitable estoppel, which applies when a plaintiff files a claim out of time based on the 
defendant’s misconduct, prevents a defendant from raising the statute of limitations at all. See 
Bennett v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 64 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1995). Equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to 
avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if, despite his best efforts, he cannot file a claim. See 
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451–52 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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future violation26—there is a new legal wrong for every instant the injunction 
is not granted—so requests for injunctions are less likely to require evidence 
created at the time of the initial wrongdoing. Consequently, there should be 
greater leeway in seeking an injunction after a substantial period of time has 
passed since the initial violation. 
But that explanation is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, even though 
injunctions target ongoing wrongs, some injunctions present the same proof 
problems as damages claims because they depend on proving events at the 
time of the initial wrongdoing. Obtaining an order directing the return of stolen 
goods requires the plaintiff to prove that he owned the goods and that they 
were stolen.27 On the other hand, some damages claims are like injunctions in 
that, although they arise from past acts, they seek relief from ongoing harms, 
as where a person seeks damages for a continuous trespass on his property.28 
The similarities between the two doctrines have led courts to bring them 
closer together.29 They have made statutes of limitations more like laches by 
recognizing tolling doctrines and concluding that for continuous harms, the 
limitations period starts anew every day.30 And they have made laches more 
like statutes of limitations by looking to statutes of limitations in determining 
whether laches should apply.31 
B. The Link Between Rights and Remedies 
The law of Remedies is not tied to one particular substantive area of the 
law like Torts or Contracts. It cuts across substantive areas of the law. 
Substantive law establishes whether a person has an entitlement; the law of 
Remedies establishes what the person can get. For the most part, the law of 
Remedies is independent from substantive law. Damages are calculated in the 
same basic way for assault as they are for trespass. For this reason, a Remedies 
 
 26. F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61 (2012). 
 27. See, e.g., Pacific M. Int’l Corp. v. Raman Int’l Gems, Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 9250(DAB), 
2012 WL 3194968, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012). 
 28. See, e.g., Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (N.Y. 1983). 
 29. Further complicating matters is that there are occasions when a person seeks relief that 
ordinarily would be obtained through a legal remedy but must proceed through equity because of 
the procedural posture of the case, as when a claim for damages is based on a violation of a 
consent decree. See, e.g., Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 30. See, e.g., Pugliese v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 681, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“[W]here a tort involves a continuing wrong, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the date of the last injury or when the tortuous acts cease.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Warner v. Sun Ship, LLC, No. 11–7830, 2012 WL 1521866, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 30, 2012) (“[W]here the statute does not contain a limitations period, the Court begins its 
analysis by looking to the most analogous state statute of limitations to determine whether the 
presumption of laches attaches.”). 
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class need not be confined to one area of the law. In the course of illustrating 
one concept, a class might discuss conversion, trespass, and securities fraud. 
Teaching a subject that cuts across substantive areas of the law has many 
benefits. Focusing on one specific area like Torts—or more accurately 
negligence since most Torts classes rarely focus on other torts—misses broad, 
unifying principles that underlie rights and remedies in our system. The 
subject-specific nature of law classes leads students to compartmentalize the 
various areas of the law as opposed to seeing them as part of one continuous 
whole. A Remedies class provides a thread that links these topics together. For 
example, it reveals to students that the same general principles guide the 
remedy for a breach of contract, a private tort, or a constitutional violation. 
But the divide between substantive law and remedies is not complete. The 
nature of the right giving rise to a remedy can affect the remedy. For example, 
an injunction is appropriate only if the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm.32 
Often, this requires a showing that damages would be too speculative or that 
damages cannot be measured in a way that would make the plaintiff whole.33 
But many courts have dispensed with this requirement for constitutional 
claims,34 instead presuming irreparable harm for those claims. (Historically, 
courts also invoked the presumption for some statutory claims, though recent 
decisions have cast doubt on that practice.35) 
 
 32. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010) (listing 
“irreparable injury” as one of the four factors that must be met for an injunction). 
 33. See Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 
U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 346 (1981) (“Plaintiff’s injury is irreparable by money when it cannot be 
measured, compensated, restored, or repaired.” (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (enjoining seizure of steel mills on the 
ground that the seizure was “bound to result in many present and future damages of such nature 
as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement”). 
 34. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2948.1 (2d ed. 1995) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most 
courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”). The justification is that 
constitutional rights protect “intangible” interests that must be “jealously safeguarded.” Ezell v. 
City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011). But that justification seems inadequate. 
Many, if not all, common law rights similarly protect intangible interests. The law against 
conversion, for example, not only protects the direct interest in ownership; it also provides the 
indirect benefit of promoting society-wide stability in property ownership, which encourages 
ownership and facilitates market exchanges. 
 35. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (overruling 
longstanding presumption of irreparable harm in patent infringement cases); Anthony DiSarro, A 
Farewell to Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Litigation, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 773 (2012) (“[T]he trend is against the presumption of irreparable harm 
for federal statutory claims.”). 
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The underlying substantive right can also shape an injunction. The purpose 
of an injunction is to prevent unlawful action.36 But injunctions need not be 
limited to the unlawful conduct; courts can fashion prophylactic injunctions 
that also regulate lawful conduct if doing so will prevent the unlawful activity 
from occurring.37 However, courts are hesitant to do so, because ordering a 
remedy that goes beyond addressing the specific wrongdoing involves courts 
in a form of policymaking. Identifying the permissible scope of an injunction 
requires knowing precisely what was unlawful. Substantive law thus limits and 
defines the available remedies. 
Likewise, remedies can influence substantive law. When interpreting laws, 
courts often consider the cost of the remedy.38 When a remedy is particularly 
costly, courts have limited the liability. The defense of qualified immunity 
provides an example. Qualified immunity applies when a private individual 
seeks damages against an official for injuries caused by unlawful conduct.39 
Requiring an officer to pay damages for his actions risks overdeterrence. To 
combat that overdeterrence, courts created qualified immunity under which 
officers are liable only if no reasonable person would have thought their 
actions were lawful at the time the officer committed them.40 
The cost of the remedy also can define the content of the right itself. For 
example, the remedy for searches conducted in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is exclusion of the evidence gathered through that search.41 
Because exclusion is a costly remedy in that it prevents the jury from 
considering evidence that might be dispositive of guilt, courts have recognized 
a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement.42 
 
 36. State ex rel. Douglas v. Wiener, 370 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Neb. 1985) (“[T]he purpose of 
an injunction is to prevent continuing unlawful activity.”). 
 37. See EEOC v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (“In fashioning 
relief against a party who has transgressed the governing legal standard, a court of equity is free 
to proscribe activities that, standing alone, would have been unassailable.” (quoting Ky. Fried 
Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 390 (5th Cir. 1977))). 
 38. Scholars disagree whether the remedy defines the right itself, or whether the remedy 
merely influences the court’s implementation of that right through doctrine. Compare Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1274, 1315–17 (2006) (arguing that constitutional rights exist independent of their remedies), 
with Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
858 (1999) (arguing that rights are defined by their remedies). See generally Kermit Roosevelt 
III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 193, 194–95 (2006) (describing the 
disagreement). 
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CONCLUSION 
Remedies is an important class, and its importance is often 
underappreciated. Remedies provide the way that law is translated from 
concepts into real world effects. They are an essential component of any 
litigator’s practice, and they are the core reason for the existence of the 
judiciary. 
Teaching Remedies can be extremely rewarding, both for the instructor 
and for the students. Because the same remedial principles apply across subject 
areas, the course provides an opportunity to draw together many areas of the 
law. It also provides an opportunity for students to learn what it is like to work 
as an attorney. That is so not only because the course focuses on the thing that 
most clients will be concerned about. It is also so because the course reveals 
that for every problem there are multiple solutions, and the task of the attorney 
is to be able to identify the costs and benefits of those solutions. 
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